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We study the role of different contract types in coordinating the joint product improvement effort of a clientand a customer support center. The customer support center’s costly efforts at joint product improve-
ment include transcribing and analyzing customer feedback, analyzing market trends, and investing in product
design. Yet this cooperative role must be adequately incentivized by the client, since it could lead to fewer service
requests and hence lower revenues for the customer support center. We model this problem as a sequential game
with double-sided moral hazard in a principal-agent framework (in which the client is the principal). We follow
the contracting literature in modeling the effort of the customer support center, which is the first mover, as
either unobservable or observable; in either case, the efforts are unverifiable and so cannot be contracted on
directly. We show that it is optimal for the client to offer the customer support center a linear gain-share contract
when efforts are unobservable, even though it can yield only the second-best solution for the client. We also
show that the cost-plus contracts widely used in practice do not obtain the optimal solution. However, we
demonstrate that if efforts are observable then a gain-share and cost-plus options- based contract is optimal and
will also yield the first-best solution. Our research provides a systematic theoretical framework that accounts
for the prevalence of gain-share contracts in the IT industry’s joint improvement efforts, and it provides guiding
principles for understanding the increased role for customer support centers in product improvement.
Keywords : IT outsourcing; gain-share contract; cost-plus contract; joint product improvement; double-sided
moral hazard
History : Anitesh Barua, Senior Editor; Karthik Kannan, Associate Editor. This paper was received on
October 25, 2011, and was with the authors 5 months for 2 revisions. Published online in Articles in Advance
November 27, 2013.
1. Introduction
The importance of incorporating customer feedback
into the product improvement process has long been
recognized. A number of studies have demonstrated
the value of incorporating customer feedback into the
product improvement process (von Hippel and Katz
2002) and in new services development (Carbonell
et al. 2009). However, the avenues of obtaining cus-
tomer feedback in product design have been increas-
ingly focused on the third parties responsible for
customer support on previous versions of products
and services. Customer support centers operated by
third parties are a primary customer-facing channel
for firms in many industries (Aksin et al. 2007). Nam-
bisan and Baron (2009) also report that firms increas-
ingly seek to establish “virtual” customer environ-
ments in association with customer support centers.
In the traditional model of customer interaction, firms
could directly obtain customer feedback on product
design and then focus on improvements using the
feedback they had gathered. But when support cen-
ters are operated by third parties, customer feedback
on product design must be incorporated into products
jointly with the customer support center partners.
There are important advantages to partnering with
customer support centers in the product improvement
process. Mehrotra and Grossman (2009) describe how,
by using information captured during customer inter-
actions, analysts from the customer support center
and the client quantified the impact of specific issues
on customer satisfaction and call volumes and then
worked with the product engineering, marketing, and
documentation groups to eliminate specific problems
from future software releases. These improvements
resulted in increased customer satisfaction as well
as fewer service calls by customers. Thus, although
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the joint product improvement effort significantly
increases the client’s revenues, it also results in fewer
service requests to the customer support center and
hence lower revenues for the support center.
An illustration of the agency issues arising in a typ-
ical joint product improvement effort is given by the
partnership between WNX, a service outsourcing firm
that provides customer support services, and Travel-
country, an online travel agency.1 In accordance with
standard industry practice (see Hasija et al. 2008),
WNX had been compensated historically by Travel-
country on a payment-per service request basis. Rev-
enues for WNX were therefore based on the num-
ber of problems that customers encountered when
using Travelcountry’s products and services. WNX
frequently received requests from customers to help
them access their itinerary as they could not access
them smoothly because of the design of the website
interface. Yet if WNX were to help Travelcountry with
the design of their website to improve the accessibil-
ity of customer itineraries, then WNX stood to lose
a significant stream of revenues because the num-
ber of service requests associated with this problem
would decrease markedly. At the same time, solving
the problem would improve Travelcountry’s product
and thus allow it to earn higher revenues. Travelcoun-
try worked closely with WNX to redesign their web-
site (including the itinerary accessing problem) and
then compensated WNX by means of a gain-share
contract—wherein the gains made because of lower
service request volumes are shared with WNX. This
case study highlights the agency issues embedded in
the cooperation between the customer support center
and the client in product improvement. If the cus-
tomer support center partners with the client on prod-
uct improvement, the client then profits more from a
product that has fewer bugs and thus serves customer
needs better, however, unless appropriately compen-
sated by the client, the revenues of the customer sup-
port center then stand to decrease because they are
contingent on the volume of service requests.
Another example of successfully applying gain-
share contracts is provided by Martinez-Jerez et al.
(2007), who describe the outsourcing of IT services
by Bharti Airtel to IBM in 2004. In this case, IBM
provided Bharti Airtel with comprehensive end-to-
end services for the management of all hardware and
software requirements for the IT architecture needed
by Bharti and all of the applications needed to oper-
ate it. Bharti Airtel was responsible for designing
and managing all telecom-specific structures and net-
works. The contract used to govern this joint product
improvement effort was a gain-share contract based
1 The names of the firms have been changed to protect confiden-
tiality.
on revenues. This joint improvement effort was very
successful, and both firms renewed their contract in
2009; the contract grew in value from $750 million in
2004 to $2.5 billion in 2009 (Vadlamani 2009).
Gain-sharing contracts are increasingly used in the
governance of IT outsourcing relationships between
clients and customer support centers (Kapadia 2010),
and they feature several managerial advantages: fewer
resources required by the client, higher levels of moti-
vation in the customer support center, and the use of
targets as milestones (Koelsch 2004). The E-Govern-
ment Act of 2002 authorized federal agencies in the
United States to enter gain-sharing contracts as “share-
in-savings initiatives” (Bierce & Kenerson, P.C. 2009).
Gain-sharing contracts have also been successfully
used by the U.S. Department of Defense (Gartner
2003), and gives both parties an incentive to cooper-
ate and improve the product or service, hence, they
are useful tools in joint effort applications. In addition
to applications of coordinating the efforts of parties in
corporate and governmental applications, gain-share
contracts are also widely used for sharing cost sav-
ings with employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 2007).
In this context, there are three major types of gain shar-
ing: (i) the Scanlon plan, that derives incentives for
employees as a function of the ratio of labor costs to
sales value of production; (ii) the Rucker plan, that
derives incentives based on the ratio of the value of
production required for each dollar of the total wage
bill; and (iii) the Improshare plan, that derives a stan-
dard for the expected hours of production, and any
savings between this standard and actual hours of pro-
duction are shared with the employees (Gomez-Mejia
and Balkin 2007).
In the IT context, the use of gain-share contracts
is usually applied to projects with prespecified ser-
vice level agreements (SLAs) for the ongoing man-
agement of IT services (Gartner 2003). In the context
of our paper, customer support centers (e.g., WNX,
IBM) that can effectively take part in the product
improvement process of a client are typically infor-
mation technology enabled service (ITES) providers.
These providers are either call centers that remotely
provide customer support via Voice over Internet Pro-
tocol , or they provide email/Internet chat support.
Note that customer support in some settings is pro-
vided by field-service engineers, but because of the
geographical dispersed nature of field-service sup-
port, such service providers do not have the scale
required to be able to credibly participate in the client
product improvement process. Therefore, customer
service that is IT enabled and hence geographically
aggregated (BPO firms), is the best setting for our
paper. Client firms that use such customer support
service providers are often the ones that sell dig-
ital goods to their customers. Such goods have a
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high volume of customer service requests that can be
handled remotely. Examples of such client firms are
online travel agents such as Travelocountry, online tax
service providers such as Intuit, software providers
such as Symantec, computer manufacturers such as
Dell, e-commerce firms such as Amazon, and mobile
telecommunications firms such as Bharti Airtel.
An important element of both the examples above
(WNX and IBM) is that both joint improvement efforts
were governed by gain-share contracts. Although
gain-share contracts are widely used in practice and
have been well documented in the practitioner lit-
erature, a number of studies caution that gain-share
contracts have to be structured well to be effec-
tive. In a practitioner blog, Goolsby (2011) points
out that revisions or renegotiations of gain-share con-
tracts occur frequently, and these renegotiated con-
tracts have worked well in practice. Wilensky et al.
(2007) make a similar point, and posit that the struc-
ture of gain-share contracts is an important element
in their overall efficiency.
As stated above, in practice, gain-share contracts
are structured in terms of the verifiable performance
output of the joint effort, and a prespecified target
performance output or standard. In this paper, gain-
share contracts are structured based on the differ-
ence between the verifiable output of the product or
service in the market after the improved product is
launched, and a prespecified target performance out-
put. Specifically, in this paper, the improved prod-
uct yields two sets of outputs: more revenues for the
client (which is usually not verifiable in the IT con-
text), and fewer potential service requests attended to
by the customer support center. The revenues from
the improved product may or may not be verifi-
able by both parties, but the realized volume of ser-
vice requests handled for the improved product is
definitely verifiable by both the client and the cus-
tomer support center. Our industry observations indi-
cate that the client and the customer support center
share data on call volumes or emails answered in
real time and also on the cumulative number of calls
and emails, so we model gain-share contracts based
on service request volumes handled for the improved
product with reference to a prespecified target level.
Apart from gain-share contracts, cost-plus contracts
are also used in IT outsourcing (Gopal and Sivara-
makrishnan 2008). We investigate the efficacy of these
two prevalent contract types (gain share, cost plus) in
the IT industry and compare contractual efficiencies
from the perspective of the principal (i.e., the client).
We develop a model of the joint product improve-
ment effort of a client and its customer support center,
where the support center’s costly efforts include tran-
scribing and analyzing customer feedback, analyz-
ing market trends, and investing in product design.
The problem is modeled as a sequential-move game
in which the customer service center is the first mover
in a principal–agent framework. The client is mod-
eled as the principal because it is the client that
hires the support center to serve its customers, and
hence needs to design appropriate incentive contracts.
The successful conclusion of such outsourcing part-
nerships entails optimal efforts of both parties in the
joint improvement effort, but this sequential-move
game is complicated by agency issues because of the
decentralized decision making of self-interested firms.
Although such bilateral efforts may be observable to
both parties, they are not verifiable in a court of law
and so are not directly contractible, which creates
a double-sided moral hazard problem. When efforts
are unobservable, the sequential-move game mirrors
a simultaneous-move game; hence the double-sided
moral hazard problem may lead to inefficiency stem-
ming from the free-rider problem (Holmstrom 1982,
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995, Roels et al. 2010).
When efforts are observable but not verifiable, the
double-sided moral hazard may lead to suboptimal
effort by the support center because of the classic
holdup problem (Demski and Sappington 1991, Nold-
eke and Schmidt 1998, Edlin and Hermalin 2000).
Therefore, the design of optimal contracts in the pres-
ence of such agency issues is critical for the effec-
tive governance of these joint product improvement
partnerships.
Our objective is to find if the first-best solution
can be achieved where the first-best solution is char-
acterized by (i) both parties making system-optimal
efforts, and (ii) the principal attains the maximum
profits possible. Specifically, we ask the following
questions: (i) What is the optimal contractual struc-
ture to be offered by the client if efforts are unobserv-
able? (ii) Can the optimal contract implement the first-
best solution for the client for unobservable efforts?
(iii) How do different contracts observed in practice
(gain share, cost plus) perform in the case of unob-
servable efforts? (iv) What is the optimal contrac-
tual structure to be offered by the client if efforts are
observable but not verifiable, and does it attain the
first-best solution?
Our findings are as follows. We show that if efforts
are unobservable then the client should offer the cus-
tomer support center a linear gain-share contract, as it
can achieve the optimal solution. However, the opti-
mal solution achieved by the gain-share contract only
yields the second-best solution. We also show that
cost-plus contracts do not obtain the optimal solution
and perform worse than gain-share contracts. Finally,
if efforts are observable we show that the optimal con-
tract to be offered by the client is an options-based
contract, where the client offers to compensate the
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.4
3.7
7]
 on
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
17
, a
t 0
5:2
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Bhattacharya, Gupta, and Hasija: Joint Product Improvement
140 Information Systems Research 25(1), pp. 137–151, © 2014 INFORMS
customer support center by either a gain-share con-
tract or a cost-plus contract at a later date. Finally, we
show that such a gain-share/cost-plus options con-
tract can attain the first-best solution for the client.
The contribution of our results to the literature
are as follows. First, in double-sided moral hazard
settings the existing literature has assumed that the
total output, in the form of revenue, of the joint
efforts is contractible (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine
1995). In our setting such an assumption poses severe
restrictions, as it is unlikely that a customer sup-
port center or a third party can isolate the impact
of product improvement efforts on the increase in
revenues for the client from the joint improvement
project. In general, the client’s overall revenues from
all activities across all projects are verifiable, but the
revenues from individual projects are not verifiable in
reality, this is an important distinction in our paper
from the literature. Instead, we use an objectively ver-
ifiable measure, customer service requests, as the con-
tractible metric and show that gain-share contracts
based on this metric are an important element of the
optimal contract. In our observation from the indus-
try, the call volume of the support center is always
verifiable and a part of the contractual agreement.
Second, no paper, to the best of our knowledge, has
shown that an options-based contract that includes
gain-share and cost-plus terms can be designed to
attain the first-best outcome when efforts are observ-
able. We note that both these types of contracts are
observed widely in practice, and our results present a
novel combination of these contract types to attain the
first-best outcome. Finally, the holdup problem has
been studied empirically in the IS literature. Using an
analytical model, we show that the option-based con-
tract can alleviate inefficiency in the system because
of holdup by providing sufficient incentives for both
parties to invest optimally. We now position our paper
with respect to individual articles.
1.1. Literature Review
The use of performance-based contracts, including
gain-share contracts for governing outsourcing rela-
tionships, has been well documented in the IT liter-
ature. In this paper, we examine the role of contract
design (using contracts that have been widely used in
the IT literature) to coordinate the efforts of two par-
ties when they both make efforts toward a common
objective (joint improvement of the product). A sec-
ond feature of this paper is that the efforts of the
two parties are sequentially exerted, with the agent
(customer support center) making its effort first, fol-
lowed by the principal (client). The third feature of
this paper is that efforts of the support center may
or may not be observable. Hence, this paper is aimed
at the gap in the IT literature on contract design in
environments with double-sided moral hazard and
sequential moves by parties with or without observ-
able efforts.
For governing outsourced relationships, the con-
tract design problem has been studied in the IT con-
text of several different applications. In the extant
literature on contract design in information systems,
a number of studies investigate contract structures
from the client’s perspective in the outsourcing of
software development and IT services, and the moni-
toring and control of outsourced activities.
In the study of governance contracts for manag-
ing outsourced software development, studies have
investigated contractual design (Lee et al. 2013, Dey
et al. 2010) as well as the effect of outcome verifiabil-
ity on contract design (Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2011).
Lee et al. (2013) consider one MSSP (managed secu-
rity service provider) making an effort in the devel-
opment of a security system interacting with multi-
ple client firms who exert efforts simultaneously for
their specific product (hence, double-sided moral haz-
ard for each party, as the MSSP and each client exert
efforts for the client’s security system), and focus on
contracts attaining first-best efforts only (and not the
highest profits for any one party). They show that
multilateral contracts consisting of a fixed ex ante
payment to the MSSP and contingent payments ex
post that depend on the security status realization of
all client firms induce the first-best efforts from all
parties. In their paper, Lee et al. (2013) show that
multilateral contracting is important to resolve inef-
ficiency due to double-sided moral hazard in their
setting. In contrast, the context studied in this paper
is different, and our focus is on bilateral contract-
ing between the client and the customer support cen-
ter. Here, we solve for the principal’s (client) contract
design problem with an objective of maximizing its
profit, i.e., either attaining the first-best profit or the
second best if the first best cannot be attained. Hence,
in our paper both the optimal contract structure and
the outcome are different (the optimal contract struc-
ture is a linear gain-share contract when efforts are
unobservable, similar to simultaneous moves, and
only the second-best efforts are attained). If efforts are
observable, then in our paper, the client can attain
the first-best solution by using an options contract
that has gain-share and cost-plus terms. Dey et al.
(2010) consider the contracting of software projects to
an outside developer; they find that fixed-price con-
tracts are appropriate for simple projects with a short
development time whereas cost-plus contracts are
appropriate for complex projects with a low cost of
monitoring. They also study contingent performance-
based contracts (with quality as the criterion) and
find that such contracts attain the first-best solution.
Profit-sharing contracts perform well when the client
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does not have the power to offer a take-it-or-leave-
it contract. Our results show that in double-sided
moral hazard environments with sequential moves,
(i) performance-based contracts in the form of gain-
share contracts are indeed optimal when efforts are
unobservable, but performance-based contracts only
attain the second-best solution. (ii) Cost-plus con-
tracts are dominated by gain-share contracts in this
environment. (iii) When efforts are observable, an
options contract using performance-based elements
as one option (in the form of a gain-share contract)
and cost-plus elements as another option achieve the
first-best solution and eliminate the effects of double-
sided moral hazard and the holdup problem. Fitoussi
and Gurbaxani (2011) find that contract efficiency is
strongly influenced by the specific types of perfor-
mance metrics used, and they offer insights into the
design of contracts based on the verifiability of those
metrics. Our study adds to this literature by showing
that verifiable outputs that only partially capture the
impact of the joint effort (support center call volumes)
may be sufficient as a contract metric in attaining the
first-best solution when the joint output measures like
project revenues are not verifiable.
In the context of joint efforts, performance-based
contracts in the form of gain sharing have been stud-
ied using case-based means in the literature. Wong
(2006) provides an application of a gain-share con-
tract based on target costs and actual costs with a
software-based decision support system monitoring
the progress of the project with respect to the target
cost. Agrawal et al. (2005) provide a methodology for
the measurement of savings to be shared using gain-
share contracts in an information technology environ-
ment. Finally, Jiang et al. (2010) show that gain-share
contracts perform the useful role of breaking the win-
ner’s curse in outsourcing relationships by mitigat-
ing buyer regret. Our study contributes to this stream
of literature by providing an analytical justification
of the use of gain-share contracts in mitigating the
effects of double-sided moral hazard when the efforts
are not observable, and in eliminating the effects of
double-sided moral hazard and the holdup problem
when used in conjunction with cost-plus contracts in
an options framework.
In the study of contractual structures for governing
IT service outsourcing, Bapna et al. (2010) give pre-
scriptive guidelines for contract design when sourc-
ing from multiple vendors who are competitors but
cooperate in a particular project for a common client.
The environment described in their study has n-sided
moral hazard, and our study provides potential con-
tract designs that could mitigate the effect of moral
hazard from the efforts of multiple partners. In addi-
tion, monitoring processes are costly but increase the
observability of efforts; in this stream of research,
Banker et al. (2006) study the impact of lower mon-
itoring and coordination costs (due to information
technology) on the number of suppliers; they find that
higher contract completeness may lead to a higher
cost per supplier—despite lower coordination and
monitoring costs and consequently to a lower number
of suppliers. Aron et al. (2008) investigate the role of
real-time monitoring enabled by advances in IT and
telecommunications. They show that the client can
ensure a minimum level of performance by vendors
if it commits to a certain level of monitoring. We pro-
vide a basis for quantifying the benefits of monitoring
information technology projects; these benefits can
be estimated in our paper as the difference between
the profits from the case when efforts are observable
(hence, the client attains the first-best solution) and
the case when the efforts are unobservable (the client
can only attain the second-best solution).
An important element of contract design in
environments with double-sided moral hazard and
sequential moves is the mitigation of the holdup prob-
lem, which describes the propensity of the client to
renegotiate the contract after the agent (as the first
mover) has exerted its effort. A recent study of the
holdup issue (Susarla et al. 2010) examines the role
of contractual provisions and options (to increase
the project’s duration) in reducing holdup and find
that both provisioning and the extendability of dura-
tion have a mitigating effect on the holdup prob-
lem. We contribute to this literature by showing that
the holdup problem can be eliminated if the parties
move sequentially and efforts are observable by creat-
ing options-based contracts using gain-share and cost-
plus elements.
Whereas our paper is focused on the impact of
contract design on the profitability and the ability to
attain the best outcome for the client, a related stream
of literature focuses on the impact of contract design
on the profitability and survival of vendors. Gopal
and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) find that the vendor’s
ability to leverage adverse selection results in ven-
dors preferring fixed-price contracts, although time-
and-materials contracts are preferred when the risk of
employee attrition is high. We contribute to the liter-
ature on cost-plus contracts by showing that they do
not perform well in environments with double-sided
moral hazard and sequential moves when efforts are
unobservable, but perform well when used in con-
junction with gain-share contracts when efforts are
observable. Susarla and Barua (2011) find that the
probability of vendor survival is strongly influenced
by contractual efficiency, and this influence is stronger
when there are adjustment costs associated with shift-
ing to aligned contracts. Gopal et al. (2003) analyze
contractual structures for offshore software develop-
ment contracts as well as the impact of these struc-
tures on vendor profits.
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Finally, our paper relates to studies in contract the-
ory that consider bilateral investments. Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine (1995) show that a revenue-sharing
contract is the optimal solution to the bilateral invest-
ment problem with double-sided moral hazard if both
parties move simultaneously. We add to this litera-
ture by showing that if the revenue is not verifiable,
but another metric (support center call volumes) that
partially reflects the joint effort is verifiable, then the
optimal solution can be attained by a linear gain-
share contract with other forms of uncertainty than
an exogenous, additive shock. Kim and Wang (1998)
show that if the agent (customer support center) is
risk-averse, then in a double-sided moral hazard prob-
lem with simultaneous moves, the optimal contract
is usually nonlinear. In our paper, since the agent is
risk neutral, we show that a linear gain-share contract
is optimal and replicates any optimal nonlinear con-
tract; further nonlinear static contracts cannot attain
the first-best solution for the client when efforts are
observable. Also, in contrast to Kim and Wang (1998),
we show that options contracts using gain-share and
cost-plus elements attain the first-best solution in this
case. Roels et al. (2010) show that if the cost to monitor
and verify the effort of the other party is incurred, the
first-best solution can be achieved by cost-sharing and
revenue-sharing contracts; yet the parties make less
than their first-best profits because of the monitoring
cost, which thereby introduces contractual inefficiency.
Table 1 Summary of the Most Relevant Literature
Papers Setting for analysis Main findings
Dey et al. (2010) • Single-sided moral hazard • Fixed-price contracts for simple projects
• Profits associated with effort-based quality and time
of development
• Time and materials for complex projects with low
monitoring costs
• Performance-based contracts yield first best
Lee et al. (2013) • Double-sided moral hazard with multiple clients • Multilateral contracts required to attain the first best
• Simultaneous efforts • Initial fixed payment to provider, with contingent
payments on ex post security realization status of all
players in the network
• System profit maximization
Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) • Empirical study on preferences of vendors for
contract types
• Vendors prefer fixed-price contracts to leverage private
information on capability to maximize information rent
• Vendors prefer time-and-material contracts when risk
of employee attrition is high
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) • Double-sided moral hazard • Static revenue sharing contracts are optimal
• Simultaneous efforts
• Client revenues are contractible
• Risk-neutral agent
Kim and Wang (1998) • Double-sided moral hazard • Optimal contracts are nonlinear in realized revenues,
but static• Simultaneous efforts
• Client revenues are contractible
• Risk-averse agent
This paper • Double-sided moral hazard
• Sequential efforts
• Risk-neutral agent
• Client revenues are not contractible
• Customer service request volumes are contractible
• When efforts are unobservable, linear gain-share
contracts based on customer service requests are
optimal but second best
• When efforts are observable, options-based
(nonstatic) contracts, with gain-share and cost-plus
terms, are optimal and first best
In a repair outsourcing setting, Jain et al. (2013) show
that tiered penalties can overcome agency issues due
to double-sided moral hazard when the agent solves
a profit maximization problem subject to a financial
distress constraint. However, in their setting, realized
downtime, which is a stochastic signal of only the
agent’s effort, is contractible. Demski and Sapping-
ton (1991), Noldeke and Schmidt (1998), and Edlin
and Hermalin (2000) show that if bilateral investments
are made sequentially, the first-best solution can be
achieved by buyout option contracts under different
sets of conditions. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) show that
if the agent is risk averse and if the bilateral invest-
ments are made sequentially, then the existence of an
intermediate verifiable signal can help the principal
attain the first-best solution. Our paper contributes to
this stream of literature by studying gain-share con-
tracts and cost-plus contracts that are based on the ver-
ifiable output of customer service requests, and not on
revenues or buyout options.
A summary of the findings of our paper, positioned
against the closest papers in the literature, is provided
in Table 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2,
we describe the model and state our assumptions for-
mally. Section 3 contains the formulation, analysis,
and results of the model as well as the main contri-
butions of the paper. Section 4 concludes with a dis-
cussion of our findings.
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Table 2 Notation and Definitions
Notation Definition
f 4 · 5 Form of contract
s Support center’s effort
 Client’s effort
I4s5 Support center’s investment corresponding to effort
Im45 Client’s investment corresponding to effort
m41 s5 Revenue earned by client (stochastic)
p41 s5 Probability of service requests
u41 s5 Service request volume (stochastic)
c Cost per customer service request
V Market size
2. Model Description and
Assumptions
In this section we describe the formal mathematical
model in detail and state our assumptions. The prob-
lem is modeled as a sequential game, between the
client and the customer support center, in four stages.
The sequence of events in our model is described
as follows (Figure 1). In the initial stage (t = 0), the
client proposes a contract f 4 · 5 to the customer sup-
port center, where f is based on verifiable outcomes.
Next, the customer support center exerts an effort in
the first stage (t = 1) of product improvement. Fol-
lowing this, the client makes its effort to improve the
product (t = 2). Finally, the outcomes of the product
improvement efforts are realized (t = 3); in this case,
the expected results are higher revenues for the client
and reduced service requests for the customer support
center. Table 2 summaries the notation in the paper.
After the contract is offered, the customer sup-
port center exerts an effort s in product improvement
and incurs an investment of I4s5. This is followed at
t = 2 by the client making an effort  toward prod-
uct improvement that requires an investment of Im45.
Finally, at t = 3, the outcomes of the product improve-
ment effort by the two parties are realized. Given the
efforts  and s, the client earns a revenue of E6m41 s57
and the probability of service requests at the customer
support center is p41 s5. The support center incurs a
cost of c per customer service request. The following
table summarizes the notation used in the paper.
We make the following assumptions about the
model parameters.
Assumption 1. The realized revenue m is a random
variable with a pdf parameterized by  and s. We assume
Figure 1 Timeline and Sequence of Events in the Model
Contract
offered by
client
Support
center
exerts
effort
Client
exerts
effort
Final
outcome
Time t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
E6m401 s57 = m0 ∀ s ∈ 6017; ¡E6m41 s57/¡ ≥ 0 ∀ ∈
6017 ∀ s; ¡2E6m41 s57/¡2 ≤ 0 ∀1 s; ¡E6m41 s57/¡s ≥ 0
∀ s ∈ 6017, ∀ ∈ 4017; ¡2E6m41 s57/¡s2 ≤ 0 ∀1 s.
These conditions imply that the client’s revenue is
increasing and concave in efforts of both parties and
that there is no improvement without the client’s min-
imal effort. The realized revenues are not verifiable.
Assumption 2. Service support requests follow the
binomial distribution parameterized by the market size V
and p41 s5. We also assume that p401 s5 = p0 ≤ 1 ∀ s ∈
6017; ¡p41 s5/¡ = 0 as  → , ∀ s; ¡p41 s5/¡ < 0
∀ ∈ 6015 ∀ s; ¡2p41 s5/¡2 ≥ 0 ∀1 s; ¡p41 s5/¡s = 0
as s →  ∀; ¡p41 s5/¡s < 0 ∀ s ∈ 6015 ∀ ∈ 4015;
¡2p41 s5/¡s2 ≥ 0 ∀1 s. These conditions imply that the
expected number of service requests is decreasing and con-
vex in both parties’ effort and that there is no improvement
without the client’s minimal effort.
Assumption 3. We assume that I4s5 is strictly con-
vex and increasing; I405 = 0; I ′405 = 0; I ′45 = ; Im45
is strictly convex and increasing; Im405 = 0; I ′m405 = 0;
I ′m45= .
Assumption 4. To rule out the unrealistic case of 
as efforts that are optimal we assume that E6m41 s57 −
cVp41 s5 − Im45 − I4s5 < 0 ∀ s ≥ 0 and E6m4157 −
cVp415− Im45− I45 < 0 ∀ ≥ 0.
Assumption 5. We assume that the functions I4s5,
Im45, E6m41 s57, and p41 s5 are continuous, and differ-
entiable in their respective arguments.
Assumptions A1–A4 ensure that the optimal efforts
to be exerted by the client () and the customer sup-
port center (s) in the joint improvement effort are
interior points. The verifiable outcome of the joint
efforts of the client and the customer support cen-
ter at t = 3 will be the number of service requests
u41 s5. Observe that this outcome is inseparable in
the two efforts, creating a double-sided moral hazard,
and that E6u41 s57= Vp41 s5.
3. Model Formulation and Analysis
In this section, we analyze the contractual structures
that could potentially yield optimal outcomes for the
client in two scenarios: (i) when efforts exerted by
both parties are unobservable, and (ii) when efforts
exerted by both parties are observable.
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We begin with the sequential game in which the
two parties coordinate their efforts to maximize joint
profits. Since the efforts by the two parties are exerted
sequentially, we determine the optimal efforts using
backward induction as follows:
∗4s5= arg max
≥0
8E6m41 s57− cVp41 s5− Im4591 (1)
s∗ = arg max
s≥0
{
E6m4∗4s51 s57− cVp4∗4s51 s5
− Im4∗4s55− I4s5
}
0 (2)
Equations (1) and (2) determine the first-best efforts
(∗4s51 s∗) in the coordinated problem of the two par-
ties to maximize their joint profits from the prod-
uct improvement effort. We now present the results
for our two scenarios (based on the observability
of efforts), starting with the case where efforts are
unobservable.
3.1. Unobservable Efforts
If the client offers the customer support center a con-
tract f based on the verifiable outcome u41 s5, then
the client’s problem can be stated as follows:
max
f 4·5
8E6m4˜1s˜57−Im4˜5−E6f 4u4˜1s˜5579 (3)
s.t. ˜=argmax

8E6m41s˜57−Im45−E6f 4u41s˜55791 (4)
s˜=argmax
s
8E6f 4u4˜1s557−cVp4˜1s5−I4s591 (5)
E6f 4u4˜1s˜557−cVp4˜1s˜5−I4s˜5≥v0 (6)
Equation (6) represents the participation constraint for
the customer support center (with a reservation value
v ≥ 0), Equation (5) represents the support center’s
problem of determining its effort, Equation (4) rep-
resents the equivalent problem for the client’s effort,
and Equation (3) represents the contract design prob-
lem for the client.
Although the decisions made by the two parties are
sequential, if efforts are unobservable then (4) and (5)
are solved simultaneously by the two parties, because
each will base its best response on the reaction func-
tions of the other. Given that efforts are unobservable,
the client’s effort will be contingent upon its expecta-
tion of the effort to be made by the customer support
center. Similarly, the customer support center (as a
rational player) will assume that the client will make
an effort that is based on the best response to its own
effort.
Proposition 1. With unobservable efforts in product
improvement, linear gain-share contracts are optimal.
The client, as principal, prefers gain-share contracts
with unobservable efforts because they incentivize
the customer support center to invest optimally in
the product improvement effort. In addition to being
compensated for its loss of revenue due to fewer cus-
tomer service requests, the customer support center
has some upside potential from the gain-share con-
tract. Gain-share contracts are increasingly being used
in the industry (Kapadia 2010) for the very reason
that they induce optimal efforts from both parties
even when efforts are unobservable, also they are easy
to implement since the cost of monitoring the verifi-
able outcome is zero. That is, in almost all cases that
we have observed in practice, data on customer ser-
vice requests are already available to the client and
are readily available for verification by legal author-
ities. Kapadia (2010) notes that gain-share contracts
need to be structured carefully to be effective. In this
regard, Proposition 1 provides guidelines on the opti-
mal structure for such contracts.
There have been other examples of performance-
based contracts leading to the optimal outcome. For
instance, Dey et al. (2010) show that in the con-
text of outsourced software development projects,
performance-based contracts that incorporate qual-
ity level agreements achieve the optimal solution.
We add to this stream of literature by showing
that, when customer support centers perform the
role of service providers and participate in product
improvement, a gain-share contract (which is a type
of a performance-based contract) achieves the optimal
solution for the client. We next analyze whether the
optimal solution is also the first-best solution from the
client’s perspective.
Lemma 1. With unobservable efforts, the optimal gain-
share contract attains the second-best solution.
Although the linear gain-share contract is optimal
for the client, it cannot completely resolve the free-
rider problem that stems from double-sided moral
hazard. This is consistent with the literature on
double-sided moral hazard, as performance-based
contracts with simultaneous moves do not attain the
first-best outcome for the client (Bhattacharyya and
Lafontaine 1995). Lee et al. (2013) show that first-best
efforts can be induced by multilateral contracting,
whereby two parties pay a penalty to a third contin-
gent on an outcome that is specific to the relation-
ship between the first two parties. In essence, a third
party acts as a “budget breaker” for the relationship
between two other parties. Since gain-share contracts
can attain the optimal solution with unobservable
efforts, but they only attain the second-best solution,
no contract can attain the first-best solution for the
client. In the literature on outsourcing contracts with
single moral hazard, performance-based contracts can
resolve the single moral hazard issue (Dey et al. 2010).
However, an important result of our paper is that
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.4
3.7
7]
 on
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
17
, a
t 0
5:2
1 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Bhattacharya, Gupta, and Hasija: Joint Product Improvement
Information Systems Research 25(1), pp. 137–151, © 2014 INFORMS 145
in the presence of double-sided moral hazard and
unobservable efforts, no contract can attain the first-
best solution for the client. The reason is that the
client can only offer outcome-based contracts to the
customer support center, and there is no intermedi-
ate update of information on the effort exerted by
the customer support center. This precludes attain-
ing the first-best solution because the double-sided
moral hazard cannot be resolved by performance-
based contracts alone. We now investigate whether an
alternative, cost-plus contractual structure can repli-
cate the optimal solution. A cost-plus contract is one
that compensates the support center for the variable
cost of service, cu41 s5, and pays the support center
an additional fixed fee, T , such that E6f 4u41 s557 =
cVp41 s5+ T .
Lemma 2. With unobservable efforts in product im-
provement, a cost-plus contract is not optimal.
Cost-plus contracts are widely used for governing
outsourced IT projects, and they have been shown to
be efficient in governing outsourced software devel-
opment contracts in some special cases, as when
auditing effort is efficient and effective and so the
cost of monitoring is low (Dey et al. 2010). Gopal and
Sivaramakrishnan (2008) find that time-and-materials
contracts (a type of cost-plus contract) perform well
when there is a high risk of project team member attri-
tion. Cost-plus contracts do not perform optimally in
the case of bilateral efforts with double-sided moral
hazard and no observability for reasons that are simi-
lar to the case of single sided moral hazard (Dey et al.
2010). Cost-plus contracts must be monitored in the
case of single moral hazard as vendors have the incen-
tive to inflate costs. In the context of this paper, the
support center’s effort cannot be directly contracted
on because efforts are not verifiable. In addition, the
fixed fee with the cost in cost-plus contracts does not
adequately incentivize the service provider to invest
in the joint product improvement effort, because it
is not linked to the improvement achieved—unlike
gain-share contracts, in which the service provider’s
incentive for product improvement is linked to the
effort invested. Hence cost-plus contracts are less effi-
cient than gain-share contracts in coordinating the
efforts of the two parties. Similarly, fixed-fee only con-
tracts do not provide the support center an incentive
to exert sufficient effort toward the client’s product
improvement initiative. The reason for this is that,
under a fixed-fee contract the marginal gain for the
support center from product improvement is solely
from the reduction in the transaction cost associated
with serving customers, whereas the optimal gain-
share contract provides incentives for the support cen-
ter via a financial reward, in addition to the trans-
action cost savings, associated with the reduction in
customer service requests.
We next analyze the joint product improvement
problem when efforts made by both parties are
observable.
3.2. Observable Efforts
When the efforts made by both parties are observable,
the problem faced by the client is described formally
as follows:
max
f 4 · 5
8E6m4˜4s˜51 s˜57− Im4˜4s˜55−E6f 4u4˜4s˜51 s˜5579 (7)
s.t. ˜4s5= arg max

{
E6m41 s57− Im45
−E6f 4u41 s557}1 (8)
s˜ = arg max
s
{
E6f 4u4˜4s51 s557
− cVp4˜4s51 s5− I4s5}1 (9)
E6f 4u4˜4s˜51 s˜557− cVp4˜4s˜51 s˜5− I4s˜5≥ v0 (10)
As before, Equation (10) represents the participation
constraint for the customer support center; Equa-
tion (9) represents the support center’s problem of
determining its effort. Note that the support center
will now exert its effort while taking the client’s best-
response function into account. Equation (8) repre-
sents the equivalent problem for the client’s effort,
which is a function of the customer support center’s
observable effort s, and Equation (7) represents the
contract design problem for the client. We investigate
the efficiency of different contractual structures, start-
ing with static contracts (noncontingent contracts that
are not options based and cannot be renegotiated), in
obtaining the first-best solution.
Proposition 2. With observable efforts, no static con-
tract can yield the first-best outcome.
The result that static contracts do not attain the first-
best solution, even if efforts are observable, is based
on the conditions for obtaining the first-best outcome
under double-sided moral hazard. In the centralized
problem, the first-best effort by the client is obtained
via Equation (1), which gives the expected revenues
from the joint improvement effort to the client minus
the cost of servicing customer requests and the cost of
effort exerted by the client. A contract will not elicit
the client’s first-best efforts unless all the upside (from
the joint improvement project) accrues to the client;
yet by retaining all the upside, the client leaves no
incentive for the customer support center to invest
in the product improvement effort. No static contract
will be able to incentivize both firms adequately to
invest their first-best efforts, so static contracts do
not obtain the first-best solution. This is an important
insight for the analysis of optimal contracts for coor-
dinating joint product improvement efforts. We now
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consider options-based contracts to see whether they
can yield the client’s first-best solution to the joint
product improvement problem.
Proposition 3. With observable efforts, a gain share/
cost-plus option contract is optimal and attains the first-
best solution. Here the client can use one of two options
below to compensate the support center, and the exercise
date of the option is set at t ∈ 42135, i.e., when both parties
have made their respective efforts in product improvement.
Option 1: Pay the support center using a gain-share
contract.
Option 2: Pay the support center using a cost-plus
contract.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows.
The client offers the customer support center two dif-
ferent contractual structures and retains the option
of eventually compensating the support center using
either structure. Option 1 is a gain-share contract, and
option 2 is a cost-plus contract. As we show in the
proof, the support center will exert an effort s∗ and
the client will subsequently exert an effort ∗ and
choose to compensate the support center using the
cost-plus contract. The intuition of the outcome of the
option contract is straightforward. If the support cen-
ter chooses to exert an effort s < s∗ then the cost-plus
contract will leave a surplus for the support center;
hence the client will prefer to exert an effort  < ∗
and choose the gain-share contract (see Figure 2 to
see the client’s preference for the gain-share option
for s < s∗). In this case the outcome of the joint prod-
uct improvement effort will be suboptimal and the
contract will lead to lower payments to the support
center than its required reservation value. To prevent
this from occurring the support center will exert the
system-optimal effort, to induce the client to choose
the cost-plus option (see Figure 2), and thereby incen-
tivize the client to exert its own system-optimal effort
and to choose the cost-plus contract (under the cost-
plus contract, the client has an incentive to invest
the system-optimal effort). The client sets the contract
parameters in such a way that, at s∗, the support cen-
ter earns a profit equal to its reservation value under
the cost-plus contract and hence the client attains the
first-best profit. Notice that the support center will
not choose an effort greater than the system-optimal
level, since doing so would lead to a lower profit for
the support center than its reservation value (because
then the client would choose the cost-plus contract).
An interesting insight from Proposition 3 is that
these options-based contracts are robust to renegotia-
tion. In general sequential move games, renegotiation
is caused because of the holdup problem, wherein the
second mover may be in a position to lower the trans-
fer payment to the first mover after the first mover’s
effort has been sunk. Moreover, Gartner (2005) points
out that outsourcing contracts frequently get renego-
tiated in practice, and over 55 % of existing outsourc-
ing contracts (in a survey of 200 executives of midsize
and large companies) have already been renegotiated
in practice. The options-based contracts presented in
Proposition 3 are robust to renegotiation, due to the
fact that the exercise date of the options contract is
after the second mover has also exerted its effort.
The exercise time of the options contract is important
as it precludes the second mover (client) from holding
up the first mover, as any such threat is not credible.
This is because, given that one of the options is a cost-
plus option and that the support center has exerted its
first-best effort, the client is better off exerting its first-
best effort and choosing the cost-plus option (thereby
earning first-best profits). Our result that gain-share
contracts used in conjunction with cost-plus contracts
in an options framework attain the first-best solution
provides an important guide to firms about the struc-
turing of gain-share contracts with sequential moves
(as renegotiation happens only in sequential move
games).
The mechanics of this options contract are illus-
trated in Figure 2, where we have taken the functional
forms of m41 s5 = 541 + s0055, p41 s5 = e−000141+s5,
Im45 = 2/2, I4s5 = s2/2, and V = 100. The support
center’s reservation value of profits is taken as v= 0.
Figure 2 shows that the support center prefers to
be compensated by the cost-plus option for all lev-
els of effort it exerts in product improvement. How-
ever the client prefers the gain-share option to com-
pensate the support center, unless the support center
exerts the system-optimal effort. Hence, the support
center finds it optimal to exert the system-optimal
effort (s∗ = 16) because doing so maximizes its total
profit. This gives the support center a total expected
profit equal to its reservation value, so the client finds
it optimal to exert the system-optimal effort level ∗,
thus this contract mechanism yields the first-best out-
come for the client.
Studies in economics have shown that buyout
options implement the first-best solution in bilateral
investment games with double-sided moral hazard
(Demski and Sappington 1991, Noldeke and Schmidt
1998, Edlin and Hermalin 2000). However, buyout
options are impractical to implement in the context
of joint product improvement effort. Buyout contracts
rely on the assumption that the agent can buy the
entire firm of the principal. But given that customer
support centers are usually small, buyout option con-
tracts are impractical in the cases that we study.
Finally, in our context, revenue-sharing options con-
tracts are also difficult to implement as most clients
that cooperate with customer support centers are
large and have multiple products in their portfolios;
hence the revenues that they publicly declared consist
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Figure 2 Mechanics of Gain-Share/Cost-Plus Options Contract
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of revenues from multiple streams, so it may not be
possible to verify which revenues have been gener-
ated by the cooperative effort on any particular prod-
uct. Second, few privately owned companies declare
their revenues publicly, in which case there may be
adverse selection effects on the revenues declared
by the client from the joint product improvement.
Therefore, in cases where revenues from the product
improvement initiative are not objectively verifiable,
it is not easy to implement contractual agreements
that are contingent on such revenues.
In contrast, gain-share and cost-plus contracts stud-
ied in this paper are both widely used in practice, and
our analysis in the previous section showed that, while
gain-share contracts are indeed optimal when efforts
are unobservable, cost-plus contracts do not perform
as well. The advantage of the gain-share contract stud-
ied in this paper is that it relies on gains achieved
via reduction in customer service request volumes, an
objectively verifiable metric. When efforts are observ-
able, we show that gain-share and cost-plus contracts
can be used effectively in combination (through the
use of options to choose either one of the two) to attain
the first-best solution. The literature has most often
studied single-sided moral hazard that arises when an
agent implements an unverifiable action for the prin-
cipal (Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008, Dey et al.
2010, Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2011) and has found that
these contracts perform well under different condi-
tions. We show in a normative model that—in the
context of double-sided moral hazard, where both par-
ties invest in efforts toward joint product improve-
ment and those efforts are observable—a combination
of these widely used contracts achieves the first-best
solution and also performs better than either contract
individually. Implementing such an options contract
should not be difficult in practice as the individual
contract types are already widely used in practice.
Furthermore, different types of embedded options are
often provisioned in customer support outsourcing
contracts in practice.2
4. Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper we study the cooperative product
improvement effort of a client and a customer support
center, where the client must incentivize the support
center to make its first-best effort, and must also com-
pensate the support center for its revenue loss caused
by the potential fewer service requests following the
joint product improvement effort. We model the prob-
lem as a sequential bilateral game between the two
parties with double-sided moral hazard. Our findings
can be summarized as follows. When efforts are unob-
servable: (i) the client should offer the customer sup-
port center a linear gain-share contract as it yields
the optimal solution; (ii) the optimal solution achieved
2 http://contracts.onecle.com/priceline/calltech.svc.1998.shtml.
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by the gain-share contract attains only the second-
best solution; (iii) cost-plus contracts do not yield
the optimal solution and, moreover perform worse
than the gain-share contracts. Our results contribute
to the literature in a number of ways. First, in double-
sided moral hazard settings the existing literature has
assumed that the total output of the joint efforts is con-
tractible. In IT settings with joint efforts at improve-
ment, it is unlikely that a customer support center or a
third party can isolate the impact of product improve-
ment efforts on the increase in revenues for the client
from the joint improvement project. In general, the
client’s overall revenues from all activities across all
projects are verifiable, but the revenues from indi-
vidual projects are not verifiable in reality, this is an
important distinction in our paper from the literature.
Instead, we use an objectively verifiable measure, cus-
tomer service requests, as the contractible metric and
show that gain-share contracts based on this metric are
an important element of the optimal contract. Second,
cost-plus contracts have been shown to perform well
in the literature in single-sided moral hazard in certain
settings (Dey et al. 2010, Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan
2008), we show that if efforts are unobservable, cost-
plus contracts never attain the second-best outcome.
Finally, Lee et al. (2013) show that in such settings, the
first-best efforts can be attained, but that requires mul-
tilateral contracting. We show that under bilateral con-
tracting, linear gain-share contracts are optimal, but
attain only the second-best outcome, and hence, the
first-best outcome cannot be attained by any contrac-
tual form.
When efforts are observable, (i) static contracts
(including gain-share and cost-plus contracts) do not
yield the first-best solution because they cannot ade-
quately incentivize both parties to invest their first-
best efforts; (ii) the optimal contract to be offered
by the client is an options-based contract, where the
client offers to compensate the customer support cen-
ter either by a gain-share or a cost-plus contract, and
the option will be exercised by the client after both
parties have sunk their efforts. Finally, we show that
such a gain-share/cost-plus option contract can attain
the first-best solution for the client.
Our results have a number of implications. First,
we provide theoretical support for the use of gain-
share and cost-plus contracts in combination in joint
product improvement effort with double-sided moral
hazard when efforts are observable. The observabil-
ity of efforts is a function of the degree of coopera-
tion between the client and the customer support cen-
ter. If the two parties work closely together, as we
observed in the example cases of WNX and Travel-
country and of Bharti Airtel and IBM, then the observ-
ability of efforts is a valid assumption because the
client can closely monitor the effort of the customer
support center. However, if the two parties work in
an arm’s-length relationship then the unobservability
of efforts would be the more valid assumption. In this
case we show that gain-share contracts are optimal
and perform better than cost-plus contracts, though no
individual contract can achieve the first-best solution
for the client.
Our results contribute to the extant literature in a
number of ways. First, performance-based contract
design has been studied in the single moral hazard
case in terms of the number of performance metrics
used (Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2011), the effect of task
complexity on agency issues (Susarla et al. 2010), the
kind of contracts to be used under different scenar-
ios (Dey et al. 2010), and the vendor’s preferred con-
tractual designs (Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008).
We add to this literature by considering the issues
of double-sided moral hazard and holdup, and we
show that options-based combinations of gain-share
and cost-plus contracts perform best when efforts
are observable, whereas specific performance-based
contracts (gain share) perform best when efforts are
unobservable. We also add to the economic literature
by showing that options-based contracts that are not
based on buyout but rather on contract types that are
widely used in practice can coordinate the two par-
ties’ efforts to yield the first-best solution.
As the research in this area is in the nascent
stage, there are a number of avenues that should be
addressed by future research. First, if both the cus-
tomer support center and the client make additional
efforts in other tasks (e.g., efforts in improving the
quality of service), then it would be interesting to
look at the changes in the structure of the optimal
contracts under multitasking double-sided moral haz-
ard settings. Second, it would be interesting also to
investigate the impact of risk aversion on the part of
the customer support center on the nature of opti-
mal contracts. The analysis presented in the paper has
some limitations that we believe should be of interest
for future studies. For example, we limit our anal-
ysis to a single period setting, whereas the setting
studied in this paper may also be applicable to many
multiperiod settings, where the parties undertake a
product improvement effort in each period. We have
also ignored the effects of competition, both in the
product market faced by the client and in the ser-
vice market faced by the support center. It will be
interesting to study the effects of competition on the
joint product improvement efforts of the client and
the customer support center. Our work assumes sym-
metric information between the client and the support
center. It is possible that in some settings the client
and the support center may have access to private
information, which would significantly increase the
economic tension in the model. Finally, in this paper
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we use customer service requests as the contractible
metric for the client’s product improvement initia-
tive. In many situations there may be other metrics
associated with product development and improve-
ment, such as approval by a regulatory authority
for new products, including which may provide the
possibility of studying a wider range of contractual
mechanisms. We believe that the role of the customer
support center in the client’s product improvement
effort is a rich setting with many opportunities for
future research that can address some of the issues
not addressed in this paper.
This paper looks at the practice of joint prod-
uct improvement efforts and models the impact of
double-sided moral hazard on the contracts described
in the literature and observed in practice between
clients and customer support centers. Our findings
indicate that clients could make better decisions when
designing contracts for customer support centers, and
the framework proposed in this paper can serve as a
guide in this regard.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that f 4 · 5= fo4 · 5 is the
optimal contract for the client and also assume that, for
the optimal contract, ˜, s˜ are interior points. We will show
later that our assumptions ensuring that ∗, s∗ are interior
points are sufficient to ensure that ˜, s˜ are interior points.
Therefore,
¡E6m41 s˜57
¡
∣∣∣∣
=˜
−¡Im45
¡
∣∣∣∣
=˜
−¡E6fo4u41 s˜557
¡
∣∣∣∣
=˜
= 01 (11)
¡E6fo4u4˜1 s557
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s˜
−cV ¡p4˜1 s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s˜
−¡I4s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s˜
= 00 (12)
Suppose we have a linear gain-share contract E6f 4u41 s557=
aV 6p0 − p41 s57+ b. Set the value of a such that,
a= 1
V
[ V∑
x=0
(
V
x
)
fo4x5p4˜1s˜5
x−141−p4˜1s˜55V−x−14−x+Vp4˜1s˜55
]
and the value of b such that
b = v− aV 6p0 − p4˜1 s˜57+ cVp4˜1 s˜5+ I4s˜50
Our claim is that such a linear gain-share contract will repli-
cate the optimal contract fo4 · 5. For the linear gain share
contract, the first-order conditions are
¡E6m41 s57
¡
− ¡Im45
¡
+ aV ¡p41 s5
¡
= 01
−aV ¡p41 s5
¡s
− cV ¡p41 s5
¡s
− ¡I4s5
¡s
= 00
Substituting the values of a yields
¡E6m41 s57
¡
− ¡Im45
¡
−
[ V∑
x=0
(
V
x
)
fo4x5p4˜1 s˜5
x−1q4˜1 s˜5V−x−1
· 4−x+Vp4˜1 s˜55
]
¡p41 s5
¡
= 01 (13)
[ V∑
x=0
(
V
x
)
fo4x5p4˜1 s˜5
x−1q4˜1 s˜5V−x−14x−Vp4˜1 s˜55
]
¡p41 s5
¡s
− cV ¡p41 s5
¡s
− ¡I4s5
¡s
= 01 (14)
where q41 s5 = 1 − p41 s5. It is easy to see that (13) and
(14) are satisfied at 8˜1 s˜9. It is also easy to check that the
second-order conditions are satisfied, and hence 8˜1 s˜9 are
the outcome of the linear gain-share contract. Furthermore,
the constant term of the linear gain-share contract is set such
that no additional surplus is paid to the customer support
center; hence the linear gain-share contract can replicate the
optimal contract. Next we show that, given our assump-
tions on the relevant functions, ˜, s˜ are interior points.
Our assumptions on the cost functions Im45 and I4s5 rule
out , so we need only show that ˜, s˜ 6= 0. First let us
assume that ˜ = 0. This implies that s˜ = 0, as when the
client exert no effort, the support center’s effort yields no
improvement in the product and the client’s profit is m0 −
fo4Vp05. Now let us consider a different contract f 4u41 s55=
cu41 s5+ T . Under this contract the support center’s opti-
mal effort is s = 0. However, we note that ¡E6m41057/¡−
¡Im45/¡ − cV 4¡p4105/¡5 > 0 at  = 0. Hence under this
contract the client’s optimal effort is  > 0. Set T such
that T = fo4Vp05 − cVp0. Then the client’s expected profit
under this contract is E6m41057 − Im45 − cVp4105 − T >
Vm0 − fo4Vp05; which yields a contradiction. Now let us
assume that s˜ = 0 and ˜ > 0. The client’s expected profit
is then, E6m4˜1057− Im4˜5− E6f04u4˜10557, and this implies
that ¡E6fo4u4˜1 s557/¡s− cV 4¡p4˜1 s5/¡s5−¡I4s5/¡s ≤ 0 ∀ s ≥ 0.
Let us consider a different contract f 4u41 s55 = T . Under
this contract, ¡E6m41 s57/¡ − ¡Im45/¡ > 0 at  = 0 ∀ s.
Hence under this contract the client’s optimal effort is  > 0,
which implies that −cV 4¡p41 s5/¡s5− ¡I4s5/¡s > 0 at s = 0.
In this case, the optimal effort of the support center is s > 0.
Now set T such that T = E6fo4u4˜10557. Then the client’s
expected profit under this contract is E6m41 s57− Im45−T ≥
E6m4˜1 s57 − Im4˜5 − T > E6m4˜1057 − Im4˜5 − E6fo4u4˜10557,
which also yields a contradiction. Therefore, a contract that
induces zero effort from either party cannot be optimal, and
there exists at least one contract that leads to interior solu-
tions for the efforts. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. By Proposition 1, we know that the
linear gain-share contract is optimal. So to prove Lemma 1
it is sufficient to show that no linear gain-share contract
will attain the first-best outcome. Let us assume that this is
not true and ∃ a linear gain-share contract 8ao1 bo9 that does
attains the first-best outcome. This would imply that
¡E6m41 s∗57
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
−¡Im45
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
+aV ¡p41 s
∗5
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
= 01 (15)
−aV ¡p4
∗1 s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
−cV ¡p4
∗1 s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
−¡I4s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
= 00 (16)
From the definition of 8∗1 s∗9 we know that
¡E6m41 s∗57
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
−¡Im45
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
−cV ¡p41 s
∗5
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
= 01 (17)
¡E6m4∗1 s57
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
−cV ¡p4
∗1 s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
−¡I4s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
= 00 (18)
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Comparing (15) and (17) yields that a = −c. However, if
a= −c then (16) cannot be true because s∗ is an interior
point. This contradiction completes our proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let the outcome of the effort game
between the client and the support center be 8C1 sC9 under
the cost-plus contract (E6f 4u41 s557 = cVp41 s5+ T ), where
the first-order conditions for the client’s and support cen-
ter’s effort game are (respectively)
V
¡E6m41sC57
¡
∣∣∣∣
=C
−¡Im45
¡
∣∣∣∣
=C
−cV ¡p41sC5
¡
∣∣∣∣
=C
=01 (19)
−¡I4s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=sC
=00 (20)
By (20), sC = 0. From the proof of Proposition 1, we know
that the optimal second-best efforts, ˜ and s˜, are interior
points. Therefore, the cost-plus contract cannot attain the
optimal second-best.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that a static contract
fo4 · 5 is the optimal static contract. Since the client observes
the support center’s effort, the client’s effort is given by
˜4s5= arg max

8E6m41 s57− Im45−E6f 4u41 s55790 (21)
The support center’s optimal effort is
s˜ = arg max
s
8E6f 4u4˜4s51 s557− cVp4˜4s51 s5− I4s590 (22)
To complete our proof, it is sufficient to show that either
˜4s∗5 6= ∗ or s˜ 6= s∗. For this it is enough to show that the
first-order conditions under the static contract do not align
with the first-order conditions for coordination. The first-
order condition for the client under contract fo4 · 5 is
¡E6m41 s˜57
¡
∣∣∣∣
=˜
−¡Im45
¡
∣∣∣∣
=˜
−¡E6fo4u41 s˜557
¡
∣∣∣∣
=˜
= 00 (23)
For ˜4s∗5= ∗ we need that
¡E6fo4u41 s
∗557
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
= cV ¡p41 s
∗5
¡
∣∣∣∣
=∗
0 (24)
We can rewrite Equation (24) as
c = 1
V
[ V∑
x=0
(
V
x
)
fo4x5p4
∗1 s∗5x−141 − p4∗1 s∗55V−x−1
· 4x−Vp4∗1 s∗55
]
0 (25)
The first-order condition for the support center under con-
tract fo4 · 5 is[(
¡E6fo4u41 s˜557
¡
− cV ¡p41 s˜5
¡
)∣∣∣∣
=˜
¡˜4s5
¡s
+ ¡E6fo4u4˜1 s557
¡s
− cV ¡p4˜1 s5
¡s
− ¡I4s5
¡s
]∣∣∣∣
s=s˜
= 00
For s˜ = s∗ and ˜4s∗5= ∗ we need that[(
¡E6fo4u41 s
∗557
¡
− cV ¡p41 s
∗5
¡
)∣∣∣∣
=∗
¡˜4s5
¡s
+ ¡E6fo4u4
∗1 s557
¡s
− cV ¡p4
∗1 s5
¡s
− ¡I4s5
¡s
]∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
= 00
Replacing (24) and (25) yields
−¡I4s5
¡s
∣∣∣∣
s=s∗
= 00 (26)
Because s∗ is an interior point, (26) implies that the condi-
tions for s˜ = s∗ and ˜4s∗5= ∗ are not satisfied. Therefore, an
optimal static contract cannot attain the first-best solution.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the gain-share option
(Option 1) the support center’s expected profit function
is çs41 s5 = aV 4p0 − p41 s55 + b − I4s5 − cVp41 s5; and the
client’s expected profit is çm41 s5 = E6m41 s57 − Im45 −
aV 4p0 − p41 s55 − b. Similarly under the cost-plus option
(option 2) the expected profits are çs41 s5 = cVp41 s5 +
F − I4s5 − cVp41 s5; and çm41 s5 = E6m41 s57 − Im45 −
cVp41 s5 − F . We will show that a gain-share/cost-plus
option contract based on the contracts described above will
yield the first-best outcome for the client. Set a such that
the client’s best response under option 1 for any s ∈ 601 s∗7
is  = 0. First we will show that a finite a will achieve this.
We want
¡E6m41s57
¡
+aV ¡p41s5
¡
− ¡Im45
¡
≤0 ∀1∀s∈ 601s∗70 (27)
Observe that, for a > 0, (27) holds ∀ ≥ ˜4s5, where
˜4s5= arg

{
¡E6m41 s57
¡
− ¡Im45
¡
}
= 00 (28)
It can be shown via the implicit function theorem that
¡˜4s5/¡s ≥ 0. Furthermore by our assumptions on relevant
functions we know that s∗ <  and ˜4s∗5 < . Hence the
relevant domain to show on which the inequality (27) is
 ∈ 601 ˜4s∗57, s ∈ 601 s∗7. Therefore, (27) is satisfied if we set
a= max
∈601 ˜4s∗571 s∈601 s∗7
−¡E6m41 s57/¡+ ¡Im45/¡
V 4¡p41 s5/¡5
0 (29)
It is easy to check that 0< a<. This implies that the best
response of the client under option 1 is  = 0 for any action
s ∈ 601 s∗7 by the support center. Set F = I4s∗5+ v. Then we
can rewrite the profit functions as follows:
çs = −cVp0 − I4s5+ b Option 1 (30)
= I4s∗5+ v− I4s5 Option 2 (31)
çm = m0 − b Option 1 (32)
= E6m41 s57− Im45− cVp41 s5− I4s∗5− v
Option 2 (33)
Now set b such that,
m0 −b+=E6m4∗1s∗57−Im4∗5−cVp4∗1s∗5−I4s∗5−v1 (34)
where  → 0+. In this case the client will use option 2 iff
the support center’s action s = s∗. Note that the support
center will not choose s > s∗, since that would not sat-
isfy the support center’s reservation value. The reason is
that here the client’s profit çm ≥ E6m4∗4s51 s57− Im4∗4s55−
cVp4∗4s51 s5− I4s∗5−v > E6m4∗1 s∗57− Im4∗5− cVp4∗1 s∗5−
I4s∗5− v, and the support center’s profit is therefore çs =
çc −çm <ç∗c −çm < v, where çc is the joint profit of the
two parties. If the support center chooses s = s∗, then the
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client will use option 2 and choose  = ∗; under this con-
dition, the support center will earn v and the client’s profit
is maximized. If the support center instead chooses s < s∗,
then the client will use option 1 and choose  = 0. This
option is clearly not incentive compatible for the support
center, since çs = −cVp0 − I4s5+ b = −cVp0 − I4s5+m0 + −
E6m4∗1 s∗57 + Im4∗5 + cVp4∗1 s∗5 + I4s∗5 + v < v. The sup-
port center will therefore choose s = s∗, inducing the client
to use the option 2 contract and choose  = ∗. Note that
once the support center has exerted an effort s∗, the client
may hold up the support center and not choose the exist-
ing cost-plus option and renegotiate it to a lower fixed fee.
However, since the exercise date of the options contract
follows the investment made by the client, the client can-
not credibly hold up the support center. After the client
exerts an effort , the support center is guaranteed a profit
of aV 4p0 − p41 s∗55 − I4s∗5 − cVp41 s∗5 + b under the gain-
share option. Thus the maximum profit that the client can
earn by not choosing the cost-plus option and offering the
support center a renegotiated contract is E6m41 s∗57− Im45
− aV 4p0 − p41 s∗55 − b. We know from Equation (29) that
E6m41 s∗57− Im45− aV 4p0 − p41 s∗55− b ≤m0 − b. Therefore
any renegotiation due to holdup will not be profitable for
the client. Hence the options contract described in Proposi-
tion 3 is robust to renegotiation.
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